More Real, Live Dragons in the Sea
As a follow up to last week’s post revealing the erstwhile existence of actual, nonfictive dragons that lived in the sea, here’s another actual, nonfictive seafaring dragon (of sorts) via Animal Review. This one, the Leafy Sea Dragon, though quite a bit smaller than its prehistoric namesakes, has the competitive advantage that comes of inhabiting reality in a non-extinct state. Its excellent camouflage and self-restraint in deploying fire-breathing faculties are likely to have helped the Leafy Sea Dragon avoid being hunted to extinction by scuba-diving Beowulf fans.
Step away from the kelp....
America’s Primary Care Shortage: Update
A few weeks ago I posted a map of primary care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) that I’d poached from the New Health Dialogue blog. The source data for the map was from 2008. Well, I didn’t realize how easy it would be to find a new map with 2010 data. Until, you know, I looked:
This map comes from the Rural Assistance Center and is based on April 2010 data from the Health Resources and Services Administration.
This update was prompted by a question in comments about whether the primary care shortage designation takes account of nurse practitioners or physicians’ assistants in addition to MDs. As best I can tell from this notice in the Federal Register (pdf) and from the Health Resources and Services Administration website, it does not. The designation of a Primary Care HPSA is based on the ratio of population to primary care physicians—MDs or DOs (doctors of osteopathic medicine)—plus other factors (poverty rate, distance to nearest provider, rates of infant mortality and low birth weight).
However, the Recovery Act does make funds available to deploy mid-level clinical workers (like NPs, PAs, psych counselors, dental hygienists, etc.) from the National Health Service Corps to shortage areas. The darker red spots on the map represent the areas of greatest need, and those are the areas with highest priority for NHSC deployments.
Everyone Who Ever Lived
Global population growth is on track to reach 7 billion in 2011. We hit 6 billion just 11 years ago, in 1999.
So, how big is the set of all people who have ever lived on Earth? About 107 billion, if estimates I’ve adjusted from the Population Reference Bureau are correct (I’ve added 600 million to their 2002 numbers and rounded down). That would mean that about 6% of everyone who ever lived is alive today.
This infographic, from Jon Gosier, helps to visualize the numbers:
Click to enlarge.
Via coolinfographics.
Weekend Wordery: Nicaraguan Sign Language
Yuri Mejia, a student at the Escuelita de Bluefields school, signing “friend” in Nicaraguan Sign Language. Credit: Christina Gomez-Mira; courtesy of Nicaraguan Sign Language Projects, Inc.
Until the early 1980s, deaf children in Nicaragua were mostly kept at home and did not attend school. They did not learn any kind of systematic sign language. But after the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, determined efforts were made to improve the country’s education system, which had until then been one of the poorest in Latin America.
Deaf children were put into schools and taught Spanish, lipreading, and fingerspelling signs—with dismal results. However, outside the classroom, the children began to improvise signs to communicate with each other. At first their signs were like pantomime, and each child signed differently from every other child. But when a second wave of very young children enrolled in the deaf schools, something remarkable happened. The younger children signed more fluidly, more expressively, and with more complex and systematic combinations. They had spontaneously standardized their grammar. By the mid-80s, Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) was well established.
NSL has afforded psycholinguists the unique opportunity to study a language in its infancy. New research led by Jennie Pyers elaborates the deep implications that language acquisition has for the development of other kinds of cognitive function. The study involved two cohorts of NSL signers: a group of pioneers whose early form of NSL lacked specific conventions for indicating spatial position (e.g., right, left, over, under); and a younger group who had learned the more developed NSL that did include basic spatial vocabulary. Ed Yong describes:
Pyers compared the abilities of people from both groups, now fully grown adults, in two spatial tests. First, she led them into a small room with a single red wall. She hid a token in one corner of the room, blindfolded the [subjects] and spun them around until they lost their bearings. When she removed the blindfold, the [subjects] had to say where the token was. The second test, like the first, involved hiding a token in the corner of a room, but this time the room was a tabletop model that was rotated while the [subjects] were blindfolded.
In both tests, the second group of adults (who learned the more advanced form of NSL) outperformed the first group. Even though their memories and ability to understand the tasks were just as good, the expanded vocabulary of geographical gestures that they learned as children also gave them better spatial abilities well into adulthood.
[...] Pyers explains, “The first-cohort signers find these tasks challenging because they do not have the language to encode the relevant aspects of the environment that would help them solve the spatial problem.”
This is a step beyond evidence that language shapes our experience. It is evidence that the development of certain types of cognitive function is contingent upon language acquisition.
References:
- Pyers’ paper at PNAS: http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0914044107 (Note that this link will not reach its target until the post-embargo publication window opens. It might take a few weeks for that to happen.)
- Photo via NSF.
Weekend Birdery: The Hummer
Is there any wildlife blog funnier than Animal Review? I suppose it’s possible. Here’s a taste, from the Hummingbird review:
Yet despite being only hours away from starvation at any given moment, the hummingbird cannot calm down and focus. While its teachers describe it as ‘boisterous,’ the truth is that it suffers from a pretty severe case of ADD, and being the only bird in the entire world that can fly backwards, sideways, directly up, directly down, and hover doesn’t help things, either. Its homework is a disaster. Thus, although it’s endemic to the Americas – North, South and Cental [sic] – the hummingbird is unable to point out any of these places on a map.
Meanwhile, while the anorexia and ADD go undiagnosed, the hummingbird stands most precariously on the edge of a heart attack. Some hummingbirds, during flight, can get their heart rates up to 1260 beats per minute. Furthermore, some species take about 250 breaths a minute and flap their wings up to 80 times per second. You’d think someone would notice. But no, we find its acute tachycardia cute.
Best, Except for All the Others
The Commonwealth Fund released a new report this week comparing the U.S. health system with those of six other advanced nations (Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The report draws on 3 surveys of patients’ and physicians’ experiences within their respective healthcare systems, as well as on data from the OECD and from other Commonwealth reports. The seven countries are ranked based on 74 performance indicators, grouped into the categories shown in this graphic summary:
Via Aaron Carroll at Rational Arguments. Out of the seven countries compared, Carroll notes, the U.S. is:
Last in efficiency. Last in equity. Last in long, healthy, productive lives. Last overall. [] Next to last in quality care. Tied for last in access. [] I challenge you – tell me where the good news is here.
Well, at least we’re not in 8th.
Filibuster Reform Resources
I was planning to follow up on last week’s filibuster reform series by posting some resources for further reading. As luck would have it, Austin Frakt introduced his own 6-part series on filibuster reform this week with a cache of links to resources, saving me the trouble. I have just a few additional sources I want to mention.
Here are some very helpful reports and articles, mostly about the nuclear/constitutional option:
- Beth, R. (2005). “Entrenchment” of Senate Procedure and the “Nuclear Option” for Change: Possible Proceedings and Their Implications. Congressional Research Service.
- Davis, C. (2005). Standing Order and Rulemaking Statute: Possible Alternatives to the “Nuclear Option”? Congressional Research Service.
- Gold, M. & Gupta, D. (2005). The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster (pdf). Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy.
- Palmer, B. (2005). Changing Senate Rules or Procedures: The “Constitutional” or “Nuclear” Option. Congressional Research Service.
And I’ll go ahead and add a few bloggers with admirable work in this area:
- I know I’ve mentioned Jonathan Bernstein’s filibuster reform series, posted as guest blogger for Ezra Klein (whose own merits are unrivalled), about a hundred times already. Make it a hundred and one. See also Bernstein’s posts on filibusters at his own place, A Plain Blog about Politics. Examples here, here, and here.
- I’m also a fan of David Waldman’s work at Congress Matters. Waldman manages to put legislative procedure and wit together in ways most people would assume impossible.
- Okay, technically Austin Frakt hasn’t published his filibuster reform series yet. It’ll be another 5 weeks before the final weekly installment is posted. But it’s sure to be insightful. I’m betting on it being a good read and a useful resource.
Warmer Than It Used To Be
David Leonhardt posts this graph from NASA climate data:
Energy Consumption by Sector
I ginned up this modest little pie chart from U.S. Energy Information Administration data after reading this post from Ezra Klein.
Interestingly, even though transportation uses account for about 28% of our energy consumption, very little of the projected emissions reductions to be achieved under climate legislation would have come from the transportation sector. As David Roberts notes, “The reason for this is simple: It takes an extremely high price on carbon to substantially raise the price of gasoline.” Roberts:
Under the American Power Act, the ceiling on the price of a ton of carbon in 2013 is $25. Even in the unlikely event that the price hits the ceiling, that will boost the price of a gas by just under a quarter per gallon. Given that gas has swung around over a $2-3 range just in the last few years, a quarter isn’t much more than noise. A recent study at Harvard found that in order to reduce carbon emissions in the transportation sector 14 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, gas will need to rise to $7 a gallon by then. Getting there from today’s $4 gas would require a carbon price of well over $300 a ton, and that, in turn, would completely upend the utility sector. So it won’t happen.
Which is all a propos of the new “utilities-only cap-and-trade bill” trial balloon floating around Washington. Even if it’s not ideal, it sounds like a productive development in what has been looking like a politically moribund debate. Read David Roberts’ piece for more.
POTUS Approval by Comparison
A nice chart of presidential approval ratings since Truman:
Weekend Spillery: Pelican Brief
Is the BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico going to wipe out the brown pelican? Not globally, at least, writes Phil McKenna at the New Scientist:
The species as a whole isn’t about to go extinct as a result of the oil spill: as 400,000 out of a total global population of 650,000 live in Peru. Roughly 60 per cent of the subspecies Pelecanus occidentalis carolinensis breed along the Gulf coast, where many nest on the barrier islands off Louisiana that have already been exposed to oil.
The slicks threaten the birds and their fragile wetland habitat only a few months after brown pelicans were removed from the US federal endangered and threatened species list in November last year. The birds had been on the list since 1970 after the pesticide DDT poisoned and nearly wiped out pelicans across the country. At the time Louisiana, where the pelican is the official state bird, lost its entire population. After years of resettling individual birds from Atlantic coast populations, Louisiana was able to boast the largest brown pelican population of any Gulf state, with 16,000 nesting pairs in 2004.
Just a small clarification: it’s true that Louisiana’s brown pelicans were just removed from the endangered list in November 2009. But the Alabama, Florida, and the Atlanta coast populations were taken off the list in 1985.
How Did Prehistoric Sea Dragons Keep Warm?
Prehistoric dragons that lived in the sea were able to (a) exist and (b) regulate their internal body temperatures, holding it above 24°C even when swimming in 12°C water, according to research described by Ed Yong. Yong notes that researchers still do not understand how the giant reptiles managed to keep their body heat up.
I dunno. Maybe something to do with breathing fire?
Filibuster Reformology, Part 5: The 60-Vote Option and Finale
This is the final post in a 5-part series on the procedural mechanics of filibuster reform. In Part 1, I considered whether the Constitution mandates majority-rule proceedings in the Senate. In Part 2, I looked at the 67-vote option for reform under Senate Rule XXII. In Part 3 and Part 4, I canvassed the 51-vote options, including the “nuclear option” and some of its variants.
Time to wrap this thing up. In this final post, I want to mention a couple of options for reforming the filibuster which could be achieved with 60 votes in the Senate. Not much here to discuss, really, but these 60-vote options deserve mention as potential routes for reform. They could well end up serving as the mechanism for a compromise—especially if under pressure of a credible nuclear threat—such as the one reached in 1975 (see previous post), when the cloture requirement was lowered to 3/5 (from 2/3, except for cloture on amendments to the rules, which still requires 2/3).
Standing Orders and Rulemaking Statutes
Two mechanisms which could create exceptions to Rule XXII and effectively modify cloture requirements are worthy of note: rulemaking statutes and standing orders.
A rulemaking statute is a statute which, like any other statute, is passed by both houses, and which establishes special procedures for certain congressional business. Rulemaking statutes are typically used to “fast track” certain priority legislation which does not get sufficiently timely consideration under the “regular order.” The best example is the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which created the budget reconciliation process and its famous exemption from the Senate’s 60-vote cloture rule.
To tell you about standing orders, here’s the Congressional Research Service:
Standing orders are regulations that have the force and effect of a rule, but are not contained in Standing Rules. Senate standing orders continue in force until they are altered or repealed, and may be adopted by simple resolution or by unanimous consent. Existing Senate standing orders govern a wide range of chamber business from the simple (the annual public reading of George Washington’s farewell address) to the complex (the creation and operation of the Senate Committees on Ethics and Intelligence). Senate standing orders are printed in a specific section of the Senate Manual.
So…standing orders are less formal than rules, but have the same effect as rules. What are the potential advantages of rulemaking statutes or standing orders for reforming cloture? CRS is glad we asked:
A potential advantage of using a rulemaking statute or standing order over some other parliamentary approaches to limiting consideration is that invoking cloture on these measures would require the votes of only three-fifths’ of those chosen and sworn (60 Senators if there are no vacancies), rather than the two-thirds present and voting (67, if all Senators vote) needed to get cloture on amendments to the Senate’s standing rules. The higher threshold for invoking cloture on rules changes is understood to apply only to direct amendments to the Senate’s Standing Rules, not to other measures having the effect of rules. In addition, in contrast to proposals to amend standing rules, consideration of a bill creating an expedited procedure statute or of a simple resolution creating a standing order would not require a day’s written notice.
CRS also notes that this approach would provide more flexibility than the nuclear option, which could only be launched under fairly specific parliamentary conditions. A rulemaking statute or standing order could also be targeted at, say, presidential nominations. The nuclear option, on the other hand, would probably be impossible to contain in such a targeted area—the precedent established for dodging Rule XXII cloture would inevitably be expanded into other contexts. At which point, the republic would be lost and all hell would break loose, as majority rule was visited upon the United States Senate.
Well, that does it for filibuster reformology. I’m planning to post some links to resources, including those I’ve relied on in this series, soon.
Filibuster Reformology, Part 4: 51-Vote Variants
This is the fourth post in a 5-part series on the procedural mechanics of filibuster reform. In Part 1, I considered whether the Constitution mandates majority-rule proceedings in the Senate. In Part 2, I looked at the 67-vote option for reform under Senate Rule XXII. In Part 3, I canvassed the 51-vote, “nuclear” option.
We need to tie up some loose nukes from last time before moving on to the 60-vote options for filibuster reform in the final post. Here’s a quick summary of the important steps in the 51-vote scenario, the launch sequence, as it were, for the nuclear option:
- Majority moves to break with Senate rule or precedent (e.g., by raising a point of order that the supermajority-cloture requirement is unconstitutional, or that further debate on a certain pending measure would be “dilatory”).
- Chair (VP or president pro tem) breaks with precedent and issues ruling to close debate on the pending measure.
- Minority moves to appeal the chair’s ruling; the question is presented on appeal to the whole Senate; debate begins on the appeal.
- Majority moves to table the appeal from the chair (a.k.a., moves the furniture). No debate; straight to up-or-down vote on tabling motion.
- Majority votes to table the appeal, upholding the ruling of the chair, ending the filibuster.
- Majority proceeds to up-or-down vote on pending measure, setting new precedent for breaking filibusters with a simple majority of senators.
Last time I mentioned that there could be many variants on this basic design, and that the key to all of them was in step 4, the motion to table the appeal from the chair, since that motion is not debatable and is decided by simple majority. Now I’ll say a little about a few of the variants.
The Constitutional Option
In my estimation, most of the distinctions between 51-vote variants do not make all that much difference. If you understand how moving the furniture (tabling the appeal from the chair) determines the result, you can see that it will work in pretty much any context where the necessary ingredients are operative. It really boils down to the intensity of the majority’s commitment to ending the filibuster era. But that’s strategy talk—you can read about that elsewhere.
So what about those distinctions? The phrase “constitutional option” is sometimes used interchangeably with “nuclear option,” and sometimes distinguished from it. I think the phrase “constitutional option” is best reserved for a scenario in which a majority of senators invokes the Constitution to claim its right to change the rules or depart from an established Senate precedent, or to claim that 60-vote cloture is unconstitutional.
Raising the constitutional question has some (relatively slight) consequences for procedure. According to the Congressional Research Service (pdf), “Under Senate precedents, the presiding officer may not rule on a constitutional point of order and instead must submit the point of order to the full Senate for a vote.” Thus the constitutional question could hop over step #2 in the launch sequence, straight into the filibuster-loving arms of the full Senate, before the furniture is laid out for the pivotal event, the tabling motion. The only thing to table at this stage would be the majority’s own motion. You want to table the other team’s motion, not your own.1
But even so, it would be relatively simple for the majority to rearrange the furniture in their favor. The Chair would only need to break two rules/precedents instead of one. The Chair could rule that the supermajority-cloture rule did not apply to consideration of constitutional points of order; or that in this narrow context, the Chair was permitted to decide the constitutional question. The minority could appeal either ruling, but the appeal could then be tabled by the majority. At that point, we’d be back to step #1, and the Chair could decide the actual constitutional question, followed by appeal, followed by tabling. Isn’t this fun?
The Opening Day Gambit
The “opening day” 51-vote variant is probably now the most actively discussed scenario for filibuster reform. Maybe that’s because there have been several such attempts in Senate history. Of course, they’ve all failed. Reformers came really close in 1975, tabling a point of order that had been raised against a proposal for majority cloture. But—as part of the deal that lowered the cloture requirement to 3/5—it reversed itself on reconsideration the following week and never voted on the proposal for majority cloture.
There is some dispute about whether this sequence of events somehow established a precedent in favor of majority cloture, even though the tabling vote that implicitly supported the majority cloture position was reversed. So…that’s an implicit precedent, explicitly reversed. Seems pretty weak to me. I suppose it creates room for argument, which creates some political cover for the majority. But ultimately, there is not, and could not be, any precedent in the world sanctified enough to protect the majority from accusations that it is betraying the republic.
Strategic considerations aside, the whole rationale behind the opening day gambit is a bit contrived. Its proponents argue that, on the first legislative day of a new term of Congress, the Standing Rules of the Senate have no effect, because they have not been adopted by the new majority. And so the new majority (or an old majority reconstituted) could adopt new Standing Rules, including reformed cloture rules.
The problem is, it has never been Senate practice to re-adopt its rules with every new term. Rather, the Senate has conducted itself as a continuous body, just as it was designed to do. And, though I don’t think it would help to point this out in any kind of formal setting, the whole reason they’re called “Standing Rules” is exactly this. They don’t expire at the end of the term. See also Rule V (“The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.”).
In my estimation, there’s nothing constitutionally special about opening day in the Senate. But it’s as good as any other day, and I don’t doubt there are good strategic reasons for reformers to act on it—but that’s a matter for another blog.
- As usual, there are different ways this could shake out. E.g., the minority might be the one to raise the constitutional point of order. There are several important precedents from Senate history that I’ve decided not to get into. They’re related succinctly in this CRS report (pdf), though, and I’ll discuss their significance another time, if anyone asks about them in comments. [↩]
Filibuster Reformology, Part 3: The 51-Vote Option
This is the third post in a 5-part series on the procedural mechanics of filibuster reform. In Part 1, I considered whether the Constitution mandates majority-rule proceedings in the Senate. In Part 2, I looked at the 67-vote option for reform under Senate Rule XXII.
Now we’ll start looking at ways around Rule XXII‘s 67-vote cloture requirement for amendments to the rules. A second option (or family of options) for filibuster reform could be achieved with the support of a simple majority—51 votes if all senators are present—and the Senate’s presiding officer.1 This option has attained almost mythical status in the political culture. It is radical, obscure, and conspiratorial, and it goes by many names. Most notoriously, due to its power and potential for devastating fallout, it has been called the “nuclear option.”
There are many variants of the 51-vote option. Some of them vary by the grounds on which they are justified (i.e., whether on constitutional or other grounds); some vary by their timing (i.e., opening day or mid-session); and some vary by their scope (whether they affect only judicial nominations or all Senate business). See CRS (pdf) for more background. I’ll have a few things to say about some of these variants, and the distinctions they rest on, in the next post.
So there are many variants and many contexts in which they may develop. But there is something common to them all: a single, distinctive procedural device that shows up in every scenario and that, in every scenario, is the decisive step in breaking with established Senate practice. That device is called “tabling the appeal from the chair,” and once you’ve sufficiently rearranged your mental furniture to grasp its significance, you will understand the nuclear option and all its kin.
When a piece of legislative business is tabled, it is set aside, removed from present consideration—in a word, dead. If an appeal of a ruling by the chair is tabled, then the chair’s ruling stands.
So, let’s say the presiding officer (the chair) makes a ruling that somehow breaks with Senate rules or precedent—e.g., by declaring the 60-vote cloture requirement unconstitutional. Generally, breaking with precedent is not something the chair is supposed to do, and some senator is sure to appeal the ruling (“appeal from the chair”). To appeal a ruling in the Senate is to ask that the question be put to the whole Senate for a vote. And in the United States Senate, if there’s a vote, there’s nearly always debate; and if there’s debate, there’s more debate. And more debate, and more debate, until cloture. And so it might seem that we are stuck: even if the chair ruled to strike down the 60-vote cloture requirement, you’d still need 60 votes to uphold the ruling, right? Well, no, actually. Not necessarily. Enter the motion to table the appeal from the chair—or, as I call it, moving the furniture. If the majority tables the appeal, the appeal is dead, and the chair’s ruling stands. “But,” you’re probably thinking, “can’t the minority filibuster the tabling motion, too?” Good question. No! It can’t! And this is why the furniture motion is so important: it is (a) not debatable and (b) decided by simple majority.2 And so, with a favorable ruling from the presiding officer, a simple majority of senators can have its way, even when breaking with the rules, precedents, and traditions of the Senate.
Let’s walk through it again, with some contextual detail—though, remember, there are many variants that work in different contexts, so the detail here is just illustrative, not limiting.
Imagine that Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid has brought the Kerry-Lieberman climate bill to the floor, debate has dragged on for a month, and Reid files for cloture (by submitting a petition signed by 16 senators). At the beginning of the second day after Reid files the petition, pursuant to Rule XXII, the Senate votes on the cloture motion. The motion gets just 53 votes, 7 shy of the 60 needed to close debate. Debate resumes, and Vice President Biden takes the chair to preside. Biden recognizes some Democratic senator, John Kerry perhaps, who raises a point of order, asking that further debate on the bill be ruled “dilatory,” and that the bill should proceed to a final vote in spite of the failure to invoke cloture. Biden agrees and rules that the Senate should proceed to a final vote on the bill. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, shocked that the majority would even consider such skullduggery, objects. McConnell appeals the chair’s ruling to the whole Senate. The question is then put before the Senate, which begins debate on Biden’s ruling. Republicans (rightly) argue that the ruling departs from precedent. And what do Democrats do? Move the furniture. Some Democratic senator, Joe Lieberman perhaps (you never know!), moves to lay the appeal on the table. Without debate, the Senate votes on Lieberman’s motion, and the appeal is tabled by a vote of 53-47. Biden’s ruling stands, and the Senate proceeds without further debate to a vote on the Kerry-Lieberman bill, which passes, saving the planet.
So that’s one variant of the 51-vote option. What’s the key maneuver? Moving the furniture—tabling the appeal from the chair. What’s so special about that? You can’t debate the furniture. So put your chairs on the table and go home. The game’s over.
- The presiding officer could be the president pro tempore or the president of the Senate, a.k.a. the Vice President of the United States. It is likely that the Vice President would have to be on board for the whole scheme to work. [↩]
- See Rule XXII, paragraph 1 (motion to lay on the table “shall be decided without debate.”). [↩]
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